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Abstract 
A  multi-sector  model  is  used  to  assess  the  targeting  of  CAP  payments  in  Italy, 
according with alternative definitions of the “real farmers” institutional sector. The model is 
based on a Social Accounting Matrix of the Italian economy, properly adapted to represent 
the process of income formation and distribution in agriculture. The accounting framework 
has been integrated with a set of microeconomic information from the Farm Business Survey, 
a sample of agricultural holdings representative of the whole industry in Italy. The effects of 
changes in CAP payments have been assessed through a process in which impacts moves 
from the micro to the macro module of the model and return, in an iterative way. A vector of 
final  income  increase  for  each  household  included  in  the  survey  is  obtained  and  used  to 
reclassify impacts according to alternative definition of the real farmer sector. Results show 
that  the  distributive  structure  of  the  Italian  agriculture  as  well  as  the  way  the  policy  is 
implemented are likely to affect the targeting of payments under alternative definitions of the 
beneficiary group. 
 
Keywords: Common Agricultural Policy, targeting, income distribution, social accounting 
matrix 
 
JEL  classification:  Q18  agricultural  policy,  D57  input-output  tables  and  analysis,  D30 
distribution general 
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Introduction 
The  issue  of  targeting  in  supporting  farmers  is  relevant  in  the  current  context  of 
decreasing resources for agricultural policy. First of all there is a problem of efficiency in 
transferring the money spent for policy to the beneficiaries: the proportion of expenditure able 
to reach farmers strictly depends on the nature of support, with decoupled payments showing 
higher transfer efficiency  (OECD, 2003). Furthermore, the ongoing changes in the public 
opinion  about  the  role  of  CAP  indicate  that  the  European  Citizen  no  longer  consider 
supporting income from farming as an objective to be pursued per se, but together with more 
general purposes such as “respect for the environment and the welfare of the farm animals” 
and “supply healthy and safe food” (Eurobarometer, 2007). In this context the support given 
to agriculture needs to be reshaped by increasing its financial transparency and re-tuning its 
policy justification. From this point of view the targeting issue is likely to become a relevant 
theme in the public debate. 
The current negotiate under the so called Health Check (HC) of the CAP seems to 
confirm  an  increasing  attention  to  targeting  problems.  As  long  as  an  increasing  share  of 
financial  resources  are  expected  to  be  moved  from  the  first  to  the  second  pillar  through 
modulation, the actual destination of the (reduced) direct payments become more and more a 
relevant  issue.  After  the  substantial  improvement  in  the  “degree  of  decoupling”  (OECD, 
2001) of CAP payments realized by Fischler reform in 2003, the focus of reforming process is 
now directed towards the simplification of the Single Payment Scheme and the redistribution 
of support. A renewed emphasis on distributive features of payments can be found both in the 
explanatory memorandum and in the impact assessment annexed to the Commission’s legal 
proposals  adopted  after  the  consultation  of  stakeholders  and  other  European  Institutions 
(Commission 2008). Among the objectives of a reformed implementation of Single Payment 
Scheme (SPS) is explicitly included the possibility to “address concerns about the equity and 
distribution of payments among farmers” (Commission, 2008: 19). The underlying targeting 
problem clearly emerges from the analysis of alternative scenarios of reformed payments. 
However the issue cannot be identified only with the bias in the distribution of support in 
favour of larger (and more competitive) farms, a well known feature of the past CAP (Harvey, 
1997; Tracy, 1997). Starting the HC with its Communication last November, the European 
Commission brings out yet another facet of the targeting problem by recalling the need to 
direct  support  only  towards  “real  farmers”  (Commission,  2007:  5).  Such  a  distinction 
recognizes the existence of an area of “farming” that should be preferentially targeted by 
agricultural policy and demands suitable (operational) criteria in order to define this area. 
Talking  about  “real  farmers”  the  Commission  seems  to  intend  people  mainly  living  on 
agricultural income (agricultural households); but alternative criteria may be proposed taking 
into  account  the  economic  nature  of  farming  itself  (only  professional  farms)  or  the 
institutional nature of  entrepreneurship (only  direct  farming). The  assessment of targeting 
crucially depends on the adopted criterion.   
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In  this  paper  a  multi-sector  model  will  be  used  to  assess  the  targeting  of  CAP 
payments in Italy, according with alternative definitions of the “real farmers” sector. The 
model is based on a Social Accounting Matrix of the Italian economy, properly adapted to 
represent the process of income formation and  distribution in agriculture. The accounting 
framework  has  been  integrated  with  a  set  of  microeconomic  information  from  the  Farm 
Business Survey, a sample of agricultural holdings representative of the whole industry in 
Italy. The effects of changes in CAP payments have been assessed through a process in which 
impacts moves from the micro to the macro module of the model and return, in an iterative 
way. Adopting such an approach, after each simulation a vector of final impacts for each 
household included in the survey has been obtained and used to reclassify impacts according 
to alternative definition of real farmer sector. 
The  targeting  power  of  CAP  payments  resulting  from  Fischler  Mid  Term  Review 
(MTR) has been used as a “baseline” to be contrasted with those from alternative scenarios of 
reform of Single Payment Scheme, including regionalization, the introduction of upper and 
lower limits to individual payments and different rates of modulation. 
The paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in the next paragraph. The 
definition  of  “real  farmers”  sector  is  discussed  in  paragraph  3.  In  paragraph  4  the 
Commission’s proposals for SPS reform are assessed according to the results of simulations. 
 
The model 
The original SAM of the Italian economy used in the analysis was estimated by the 
Regional Institute for Economic Planning in Tuscany (IRPET). The reference year (2002) can 
be considered as representative for Italian agriculture of the first half of the decade in terms of 
level and composition of productions and prices. Moreover, 2002 is included in the reference 
period  for  the  determination  of  SPS  entitlements  under  the  MTR.  The  original  structure 
includes a total of 101 accounts: besides a production block accounting for 30 industries and 5 
factors of production, a detailed description of consumptions (12 private plus 11 collective 
consumption functions) and a highly disaggregated institutional sector block (10 household 
groups  by  deciles  of  per-capita  equivalent  income,  3  group  of  firms,  and  9  government 
branches  at  the  national  and  local  level)  represents  the  most  interesting  feature  of  the 
accounting scheme. Separate capital accounts for each institution and ROW accounts assure 
the overall balancing of the matrix. 
The SAM was adapted for analytical purposes. A reduction of the SAM dimensions 
was carried out aggregating the accounts for institutions. The original accounts for households 
were aggregated into five groups, given that the aim of the analysis was the inclusion of a 
second  dimension  (farmers  vs.  non  farmers)  to  be  crossed  with  income  level  in  the 
classification  of  families.  Also  the  different  branches  of  public  administration  have  been 
consolidated into a single government account.   
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A second major adaptation of the SAM was the inclusion of an account to explicitly 
represent the process of income formation and distribution at the farm level. In the adapted 
SAM the inflows of agricultural holdings account are the valued added from agriculture gross 
of depreciations and the transfers from the government. On the relevant column agricultural 
holdings pay taxes on production, and distribute income to  factors of production such  as 
employed labor and capital
1. In table 1 are displayed the entries of the agricultural holdings 
account. The value added from production amounts to 27 783 M€, representing more than 
90% of total inflows. The largest part of these inflows is distributed as mixed income form 
farming to self employed labour (21 272 M€, 69,6%). 
Besides accounts for production units in the model were included as endogenous the 
accounts for production activities, factors of production and private institutions (households’ 
consumption and income accounts, firms current accounts). The focus on income distribution 
suggested the opportunity to also include in the model a consolidate account for the national 
Government. Indeed, the aim of the model is to analyse at the national level the short run 
impacts on income distribution of a sectoral policy defined at the European level (payments to 
farms). Conversely all accounts for capital formation and for flows to/from the rest of the 
world were considered as exogenous. 
From the adapted SAM a matrix of accounting (column) coefficients for endogenous 
accounts  was  derived.  To  increase  the  quality  of  simulation,  following  the  “fixed  price” 
approach  proposed  by  Pyatt  and  Round  (1979)  the  accounting  coefficient  for  private 
consumption  functions  were  replaced  with  estimates  of  marginal  propensities  (by  income 
quintile) based on data from Households Budget Survey carried out by ISTAT. A second 
change was made on the entries of the submatrix representing transfers from Government to 
production units. Even though payments to farms depend for the most part from decisions 
taken  at  the  European  level,  positive  coefficients  in  this  block  would  lead  to  a  level  of 
transfers endogenously determined in a national model. To avoid this controversial effect the 
relevant coefficients were set to zero. As a consequence the endogenization of the Italian 
government account affects income distribution only through general fiscal policies defined at 
the national level (represented in the submatrix of transfers among endogenous institutions). 
The inclusion of an account for agricultural holdings is an essential passage in the 
integration of available microeconomic information in the model. In fact the Farm Business 
Survey is a sample of more than 13 000 agricultural holdings representative of the whole 
industry  carried  out  by  the  Italian  National  Institute  of  Statistics  (ISTAT:  see  Rocchi  e 
Pizzoli, 2007). Being carried out to provide information for national accounting purposes, the 
definitions of economic variables are completely consistent with those on which the structure 
of the original SAM was grounded. The most interesting feature of the survey is that, even if 
designed following an “industry” approach (i.e. a sample of farms), it also provides useful 
information  on  the  institutions  managing  production  activities.  More  precisely,  the  FBS 
                                                 
1 For simmetry reasons an account for “other production units” was included too.   
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sample is representative both for farms and for the institutional sector of households earning 
some incomes from farming activities. Using data on sources of income other than farming 
(by type and by income class) collected with FBS an estimate of the total household income 
for each observation was carried out. Each observation was then assigned to the relevant 
quintile of total population. Finally, according to information included in the original SAM, 
five  “artificial”  observations  were  included  in  the  dataset  to  represent  all  other  Italian 
households without income from farming that are included in each quintile of population. 
Data  from  FBS  where  then  calibrated  to  exactly  replicate  the  aggregate  entries  of  the 
agricultural household account. 
Simulations are carried out as follows
2. Using available micro information a vector of 
changes  in  CAP  payments  received  by  each  (weighted)  observation  due  to  a  particular 
hypothesis of reform is calculated. The subsequent changes in income distributed to factors 
and, through factors, to institutions (households by income level and others) are calculated as 
well. During the micro-simulation the incomes accruing to households and other institutions 
are  corrected  to  account  for  inter-institutional  transactions  (according  with  SAM  average 
coefficients)  At  the  end  of  this  first  round  of  micro-simulation,  a  weighted  vector  of 
exogenous impacts on accounts for institutions is composed summing data for households by 
income quintile. 
In  the  macro  module  of  the  simulation  the  vector  of  impacts  on  institutions  is 
transformed into additional increases in the value added distributed by production units using 
the accounting framework of the SAM. The matrix of direct (column) coefficients calculated 
on the adapted SAM is used: 
-  to transform income increases into expenditure increases classified by consumption 
function; 
-  to transform expenditure increases into increases in the final demand directed towards 
industries. 
The resulting exogenous increases in final demand are then transformed into a total 
output increases by industry using the (leontievian) multipliers derived from the input-output 
block  of  the  original  table.  Finally,  using  again  direct  coefficients,  output  increases  are 
transformed into increases of gross value added distributed to factors by production units 
(agricultural households and other production units). These further increases in value added 
are distributed among observations of the microeconomic dataset, starting up a new round of 
micro-simulation. The process is repeated till additional increases in incomes of institutions 
become  irrelevant.  Given  the  “leakages”  of  the  model  towards  exogenous  accounts, 
simulations converge to a acceptable result after few iterations. In figure 1 is represented for 
exemplificative purposes the cumulative impact estimated after each round in the simulation 
of SPS under the Mid Term Review. After the fifth round the total impact increases for less 
than 1% in each subsequent iteration. 
                                                 
2 The program to carry out the simulation has been implemented using MATLAB.   
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Despite  the  integration  of  the  SAM  with  a  source  of  microeconomic  information, 
results can be considered of the same nature of those that could be obtained from a standard 
linear model. No additional behavioural assumptions have been included in the model through 
the micro-simulation module: incomes are linearly distributed among production units, factors 
and institutions according  with weighted sample shares. The main result of the micro-to-
macro integration is the possibility to assess impacts of policy under alternative definitions of 
the  beneficiary  group.  In  fact  after  each  simulation  a  vector  of  final  impacts  for  each 
household included in the survey is obtained and can be used to reclassify impacts according 
to alternative definition of real farmer sector. A secondary positive effect is the reduction of 
the  bias  of  aggregation  that  is  implicit  in  all  model  based  on  multisectoral  accounting 
frameworks. 
 
Defining real farmers 
As stressed above, the main objective of the analysis was to assess the targeting power 
of possible, alternative changes in the SPS. It is clear that the results of such an analysis 
strictly depend on the adopted definition of beneficiary group. In the current framework of 
CAP Italian beneficiaries are basically chosen according to a double condition of eligibility: 
 
-  they had to be beneficiaries of CAP payments during the “reference period” (2000-
2002); 
-  they have to manage an area of eligible land corresponding to the assigned “historical” 
entitlements. 
 
In this way the SPS payments are directed towards a number of different institutions 
(households,  corporations,  branches  of  public  administration  and  so  on)  and,  within  the 
household  sector  (which  accrues  for  the  largest  part  of  payments)  towards  very  different 
institutional units. 
The analysis has been focused on the households sector. According to the available 
microeconomic information three alternative criteria of classification of households earning at 
least  some  income  from  farming  (being  or  not  current  beneficiaries  of  SPS)  have  been 
defined. All criteria can be considered an alternative way for identifying “real farmers” to be 
preferentially  supported  within  the  first  pillar  of  the  CAP.  Each  criterion  focuses  on  a 
particular aspect of the relevance that farming activity can assume for a given household. 
 
-  Agricultural  households.  According  to  this  definition  the  targeted  group  should 
include  households  for  which  income  from  farming  is  more  than  50%  of  total 
household income. This can be considered a “narrow” definition of the institutional 
sector according to standard for national accounts (Eurostat, 1996). The interpretation   
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of farmers as “agricultural households” is suitable for supporting analysis on living 
standards and/or income strategies associated with farming activities (Unece, 2007). In 
this analysis the available microeconomic information allowed to directly apply the 
proposed criterion. 
-  Direct farmers. According to this definition the targeted group should include farmers 
managing agricultural production activities using for the largest part family labour. 
This definition of beneficiaries assumes a correspondence between the way the factors 
are organized in each production unit and the belonging of farming household to a 
specific  socio-economic  group.  In  other  words  farms  can  be  classified  by  types 
reflecting different goals achieved through farming by institutions. Direct farming is 
the prevalent management form in Italy: in the largest part of agricultural holdings at 
least  some  labour  is  supplied  by  the  farmer’s  family.  In  the  proposed  analysis  a 
prevalence criterion has been applied including in the group of direct farmers only 
households managing farms in which wages paid to employees were less than 50% of 
the mixed income accruing to the farmer
3. 
-  Professional farmers. According to this definition the targeted group should include 
only households managing “professional” farms, i.e. production units with economic 
dimensions  allowing  for  a  entrepreneurial  management  of  farming  business.  This 
targeting criterion can be considered coherent with a vision of agriculture as a branch 
of productive system and a “industry” vision of agricultural policy. In the analysis the 
‘professional’  criterion  has  been  applied  including  in  the  group  all  households 
managing farms with an economic size greater than 7 European Size Units, according 
to the FADN system of classification. 
 
Simulation results 
Even if leaving the beneficiary free to choose if and how much produce, the payments 
under the current CAP cannot be considered as completely decoupled. In the case of area 
based payments “…current conditions attached to payments, such as … requiring minimum 
maintenance  activities  on  the  land  or  imposing  cross  compliance  condition  may  create 
incentives  to  change  production  patterns”  (OECD,  2005:  8),  even  in  the  absence  of  an 
obligation to produce. This seems to be the case of SPS, a form of support directed towards 
active production units, which have to comply with minimum requirements (such as Statutory 
Management Requirement and Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition). Moreover, 
the quantification on a historical basis chosen for Italy reinforced till now the “compensatory” 
nature  of  payments.  This  sort  of  support  could  be  represented  as  a  payment  positively 
affecting the income distributed at the farm level to the factors of production, without any 
direct  effect  on  the  output  level  (and  on  intermediate  costs).  In  a  SAM  model  this  is 
                                                 
3 The ratio between mixed incomes and wages has been used as a proxy of the ratio between employed and 
family labour used in farming for which micro-information was missing.   
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equivalent to generate an exogenous injection towards the account of agricultural holdings. 
The first round of the iterative process described in paragraph 2 reproduces at the micro level 
the same mechanism to start the simulation. A set of alternative distributions of payments 
under different hypotheses of application of the SPS were calculated and used to generate 
different  first  impact  scenarios.  The  resulting  vectors  of  total  increase  in  the  households’ 
incomes  generated  at  the  micro  level  were  then  used  to  compare  the  targeting  power  of 
alternative policy options. 
A  first  group  of  simulations  were  carried  out  to  analyse  the  “pure”  impact  of 
exogenous injections towards the income of different groups of targeted beneficiaries. This 
exercise allows understanding the distributive features emerging from the structure of Italian 
agriculture as represented by the SAM. 
Table 2 displays the nominal income multipliers for exogenous increases in the value 
added distributed by farms managed by different group of farmers, such as a policy driven 
payment directed towards production units. For example, an exogenous increase of 1 M€ of 
value  added  distributed  by  professional  farms  generates  through  the  circular  flow  of  the 
economy a final increase of households’ income of 2.37 M€. This total increase is distributed 
among all Italian households, including both targeted beneficiaries and other households. The 
final distributive profile is represented by values in the column, showing income multipliers 
for targeted and non targeted families divided by income level. In the case of professional 
farms the impact on incomes increases moving from lower to higher quintiles and doesn’t 
show a different profile between targeted and non targeted households. The result is a lower 
targeting power in supporting professional farms: only 36.4% of total final impact (including 
indirect and induced impacts through the circular flow) accrues to the targeted families, i.e. 
households managing professional farms. By contrast, exogenous injections towards farming 
activities  managed  by  agricultural  households  and  direct  farmers  shows  a  targeting  index 
equal to 51.3 and 55.4% respectively. The value of targeting index clearly depends on the 
extent  by  which  indirect  impacts  change  (and  eventually  reverse)  the  distributive  profile 
generated by the initial injection. For a better assessment of the effect of circular flow on 
targeting, in table 3 have been displayed the percentage profiles of direct, indirect and total 
impacts on incomes. The initial shock in this simulation is by definition perfectly targeted, 
showing a distributive profile depending on the relative importance of holdings managed by 
each group in terms of value added distributed to factors
4. A slight differentiation can be 
observed  among  the  three  groups  of  holdings  with  those  managed  by  direct  farmers 
distributing a higher share of direct impacts towards poorer households. The indirect impacts 
generated by the circular flow mainly affect non targeted groups of households in the highest 
quintiles  of  population:  as  a  consequence  the  best  index  of  indirect  targeting,  shown  by 
support toward direct farmers, is only equal to 5.4%. On the whole the circular flow seems 
                                                 
4 In other terms, depending on distributive structural features of Italian agriculture.   
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able  to  spread  the  income  increase  in  the  rest  of  the  population  but  without  generating 
substantial changes in the distribution of incomes among quintiles. 
So far simulations have been carried out to represent a hypothetical support directed 
only towards single groups of beneficiaries clearly defined using some criteria. The same 
classification  can  be  used  to  assess  the  targeting  power  of  actual  form  of  support  to 
agriculture  under  the  current  CAP.  To  each  policy  scenario  can  be  assigned  a  different 
targeting score according to the chosen definition of the “real farmer” sector. 
The  distributive  impact  of  CAP  payments  resulting  from  Fischler  reform  can  be 
assessed using figures in table 4. The total impact on households’ income is decomposed into 
direct and indirect effect. The total impact of more than 6 800 M€ corresponds to an income 
nominal  multiplier  of  2.142.  The  multiplicative  impact  increases  moving  toward  richer 
households  even  if  not  in  a  monotonic  way.  More  interesting  is  the  redistributive  effect 
associated with the total impact. The figures in the last column depict the changes in the 
relative position of each quintile in the income distribution. Their sum is equal to 0 as they 
expresses in percentage terms the redistribution among quintiles of the initial income (i.e. 
without the impact of the considered policy) necessary to exactly reproduce the final income 
distribution in relative terms (i.e. income distribution with policy). The redistributive profile 
shows controversial features, with a large negative effect in the second quintile and the largest 
share of positive effects for the first one.
5 However, the low level of disaggregation of the 
households  sector  hides  the  redistributive  games  within  each  group.  Indeed,  within  each 
income quintile, the CAP payments are directed towards households that may or may not be 
included  in  the  beneficiary  group  according  to  some  classification  criterion.  As  a 
consequence, for the impact assessment of a sector policy as the CAP payments are, a sector-
related criterion is needed to classify households. 
In table 5 the impact of four tools proposed by the European Commission with the aim 
of reforming the implementation of SPS are compared under alternative definitions of the 
“real farmers” sector. The columns correspond to alternative scenarios, built modifying the 
current distribution of CAP payments in Italy as follows: 
 
-  regional flat rate: new payment entitlements based on a regional flat rate per hectare 
applied  to  all  eligible  areas  plus  5%  of  compulsory  modulation  over  5000€  of 
individual payments; 
-  approximation: historical payments approximated according to a regional flat rate plus 
5% of compulsory modulation over 5000€ of individual payments; 
-  minimum individual limit: MTR payments with set-off of individual payments up to 
500€; 
                                                 
5  Intuitively  the  positive  or  negative  value  of  redistributive  impact  for  a  given  group  depends  on  the  ratio 
between the share of income accruing to the group in the initial distribution and the percentage increase of its 
income due to the policy. A generalization of the analysis of redistributive impacts based on SAM multipliers is 
proposed by Roland Holst and Sancho (1992).   
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-  progressive modulation: MTR payments with basic rate of modulation increased to 
12% and progressive reduction of individual payments. 
 
The  introduction  of  a  regional  flat  rate  shows  the  higher  multiplicative  effect  on 
households’ incomes both in general (total multiplier) and considering the specific multiplier 
(unitary  increase  of  incomes  of  targeted  households  for  each  euro  of  direct  increase  of 
targeted incomes due to payments). The total targeting index doesn’t seem to be affected by 
the  application  of  different  instruments,  with  only  the  regional  flat  rate  showing  a  value 
slightly lower. On the contrary, the use of alternative targeting criteria leads to quite different 
assessment: whatever the new instrument introduced, the CAP payments shows the better 
targeting  towards  direct  farmers  (more  than  56%  in  all  cases)  followed  by  agricultural 
households and professional farmers. Policy instruments rather affect the level of indirect 
targeting: the introduction of a regional flat rate and of a system of progressive modulation 
seems more likely to strengthen the targeting of payments through the multiplicative process 
due  to  the  circular  flow  of  incomes  within  the  economy.  A  higher  indirect  efficiency  in 
targeting as well as a higher redistributive power
6 emerges when direct farming is chosen as a 
targeting criterion. 
A further insight of the analysis can be carried out looking at figures in table 6 where 
the redistributive effects (as in the last column of table 4) of the proposed policy tools are 
assessed  under  alternative  definition  of  beneficiaries.  The  distributive  profile  is  mainly 
affected by the choice of the beneficiary group. The current structure of CAP, whatever the 
form of implementation considered, shows again a better targeting of the direct farmers group 
within  which  the  positive  redistributive  effects  are  distributed  among  quintiles  in  a  more 
homogeneous  way.  On  the  contrary  CAP  payments  leads  to  a  larger  improvement  in  the 
relative position of the higher quintiles of the beneficiary group if the professional farming is 
assumed as the relevant classification criteria for policy analysis. Under this definition of 
beneficiaries, when a flatter rate of support is introduced (regionalization and approximation), 
indirect  impacts  are  able  to  improve  also  the  relative  position  of  households  of  the  first 
quintile of total population not included in the beneficiary group. 
Till  now  the  analysis  focused  on  the  impact  of  single  measures  included  in  the 
Commission’s proposal for a new Regulation. The actual implementation of reformed SPS 
will  result  from  a  combination  of  them  that  could  vary  among  member  states,  given  the 
flexibility  allowed  in  the  application  of  optional  measures  (regionalization  and 
approximation)  and  the  pending  negotiation  on  compulsory  ones  (minimum  level  and 
progressive  modulation).  In  order  to  complete  the  analysis  two  alternative  scenarios  of 
application  have  been  defined  according  to  the  main  objectives  pursued  by  Commission 
through the reform of SPS: the reduction of administrative costs and the move towards a more 
                                                 
6 The redistributive power is expressed as the percentage ratio between the absolute redistributive effect (i.e. 
euros of initial income that is necessary to redistribute among groups to exactly reproduce the ex post distributive 
profile) and the initial injection towards households’ incomes due to the policy.   
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flat rate of support for equity reasons. Depending on the relative importance assigned to these 
objectives, two scenarios of implementation have been defined as follows: 
-  redistribution:  application  of  a  regional  flat  rate  combined  with  progressive 
modulation; 
-  simplification: approximation of existing entitlements to a (regional) homogeneous 
average  rate  combined  with  the  introduction  of  a  minimum  level  of  individual 
payments. 
Both scenarios include a basic rate of modulation increased to 13%. 
The two scenarios are contrasted with the current application of mid term review in 
table 7. The reform of payments seems able to improve the targeting of payments in both 
scenarios.  Moreover,  the  “simplification”  hypothesis  reduces  the  differences  between 
targeting index measured under different definitions of the beneficiary group: in other word 
could be considered the better “compromise” from a targeting point of view. 
Again, all scenarios of application are better targeted towards direct farmers both in 
total and when only indirect impacts are considered. Finally a sort of trade off between direct 
and  indirect  targeting  is  shown  by  the  two  scenarios  of  reform:  while  the  simplification 
scenario shows a higher total targeting, the redistribution one is more likely to positively 
affect incomes of targeted groups through indirect impacts. 
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Table 1 - Agricultural holdings accounts 






Gross value added at market prices  27 783  90.9 
Transfers to productions  2 770  9.1 
     
Total inflows of agricultural households  30 553  100.0 
     
Taxes on production  1 886  6.2 
Wages  7 116  23.3 
Rents for land  902  3.0 
Corporate farms mixed income  -623  -2.0 
Agricultural self employed labour mixed income  21 272  69.6 
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Table 2 - Household income nominal multipliers by targeted group of holdings and institutional sectors (€) 
    holdings managed by 









1  0.09  0.13  0.03 
2  0.06  0.09  0.04 
3  0.14  0.21  0.11 
4  0.23  0.23  0.22 




1  0.06  0.05  0.08 
2  0.11  0.10  0.13 
3  0.16  0.13  0.20 
4  0.21  0.20  0.26 
5  0.42  0.40  0.48 
total  1.98  1.96  2.37 
total targeting  51.3%  55.4%  36.4% 
indirect targeting  1.4%  5.4%  1.4%   
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Table 3 - Direct and indirect impact of supporting different group of farms on households income 
% values 
      direct impact  indirect impact  total impact 





















1  9.0  12.1  2.9  0.1  0.9  0.1  4.6  6.8  1.3 
2  6.0  7.5  4.2  0.1  0.9  0.1  3.1  4.4  1.8 
3  13.8  18.2  13.1  0.2  2.0  0.3  7.1  10.6  5.7 
4  22.7  21.2  25.2  0.3  0.8  0.3  11.6  11.6  10.9 




1  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.5  5.8  6.7  3.2  2.7  3.9 
2  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.3  10.5  11.6  5.6  5.0  6.7 
3  0.0  0.0  0.0  16.4  14.5  16.9  8.1  6.9  9.8 
4  0.0  0.0  0.0  21.6  21.1  22.2  10.7  10.0  12.8 
5  0.0  0.0  0.0  42.7  42.7  41.2  21.1  20.1  23.8 
total to targeted  100.0  100.0  100.0  1.4  5.4  1.4  51.3  55.4  43.0 
 
 
Table 4 - Distributive impact of the MTR payments 
M€ and % values 
quintiles 











           
1  485  250  735  0.231  67.3 
2  152  430  581  0.183  -92.8 
3  520  626  1 145  0.361  11.8 
4  682  819  1 501  0.473  20.9 
5  1 338  1 503  2 840  0.894  -7.2 
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Table 5 - Impacts of alternative measures for reforming SPS under different definitions of beneficiaries 











  agricultural hholds 
total multiplier  2.054  1.984  1.997  2.010 
specific multiplier  1.197  1.148  1.148  1.170 
total targeting  46.5%  47.4%  47.9%  47.9% 
indirect targeting  14.9%  12.3%  12.4%  13.9% 
redistribution  0.92  0.90  0.92  0.92 
  direct farmers 
total multiplier  2.054  1.984  1.997  2.010 
specific multiplier  1.220  1.174  1.176  1.196 
total targeting  56.6%  56.6%  56.2%  56.5% 
indirect targeting  19.9%  16.9%  16.8%  18.5% 
redistribution  1.04  1.01  1.01  1.02 
  professional farmers 
total multiplier  2.054  1.984  1.997  2.010 
specific multiplier  1.208  1.158  1.158  1.176 
total targeting  41.6%  42.6%  43.6%  43.7% 
indirect targeting  13.9%  11.7%  11.9%  13.0% 
redistribution  0.82  0.82  0.83  0.84 
 
 
   
17 
Table 6 
Redistributive effects of alternative measures under different definitions of beneficiaries 
% values 




limit  progressive modulation 



























1  7.5  10.2  1.5  7.5  10.6  1.0  6.8  9.5  1.0  6.3  8.9  1.2 
2  4.8  6.1  2.8  4.0  4.5  2.3  3.9  4.0  2.3  5.1  5.8  3.1 
3  13.3  16.6  12.2  13.1  15.4  12.4  12.8  14.8  12.3  13.0  15.1  12.5 
4  22.1  21.3  24.5  23.4  23.1  25.5  23.2  23.2  25.4  23.0  22.7  25.4 




1  -5.7  -8.7  0.5  -5.5  -8.7  1.3  -6.0  -8.8  -0.1  -6.1  -8.7  -0.9 
2  -11.2  -11.7  -10.0  -12.0  -11.7  -11.1  -12.3  -11.7  -11.7  -11.6  -11.7  -10.3 
3  -10.9  -14.5  -9.5  -12.0  -14.5  -11.3  -12.5  -14.5  -12.0  -12.4  -14.5  -11.7 
4  -21.2  -20.5  -23.5  -20.4  -20.5  -22.3  -20.2  -20.5  -22.0  -20.7  -20.6  -22.8 




Targeting of alternative scenarios of 
implementation of SPS under different 
definition of beneficiaries 
   agric hhs  dir farmrs  prof farmrs 
  total targeting 
mid term review  39.1%  47.5%  35.2% 
HC redistribution  46.4%  56.9%  41.4% 
HC simplification  48.3%  56.4%  44.3% 
  indirect targeting 
mid term review  1.4%  5.4%  1.5% 
HC redistribution  14.9%  19.9%  13.8% 
HC simplification  14.0%  18.5%  13.2% 
 